LIBERTÀ E NECESSITÀ NELL'INIZIO DELLA SCIENZA DELLA LOGICA: UN CONFRONTO TRA LA PRIMA E LA SECONDA EDIZIONE
AbstractVersion:1.0 StartHTML:0000000178 EndHTML:0000004125 StartFragment:0000002847 EndFragment:0000004089 SourceURL:file://localhost/Users/leonardosamona/Desktop/70-314-1-SM.doc The beginning of Logic has a close relationship with the outcome of the Phenomenology, wich Hegel summed up in a few lines in the chapter on the beginning of science: the ultimate foundation of phenomenological course is the free alienation of absolute knowledge, that makes itself other remaining in unity with itself. The paper shows the relation between the free self-alienation and the task of a "logical", "immanent" beginning of the philosophy, and the relation binding the logical necessity and the freedom. The differences between the first and the second edition of the Hegelian work are used to show how the growth of attentino paid to the free decision of the beginning, which is recorded in the transition from the first to the second edition, is not to be understood as intensification of subjective arbitrariness, but as freedom of the subject to "sacrifice" himself, i.e. to make oneself moment of the objective truth.