Giornale di metafisica

Nota critica a Jacques Derrida, Séminaire La Peine de Mort. Volume I (1999-2000)

2014-01-10T16:41:40+00:00

A reflection about capital punishment starting from the first volume of Jacques Derrida’s seminary La peine de mort, recently edited by the Galilée publishing house. We will analyse and we will question at the same time the reasons of the supporters of the death penalty – in the philosopher’s opinion the highest expression of the exceptionality of the sovereignty – and the reasons of the abolitionists, whose arguments – first of all the one about cruelty – are, according to Derrida, still extremely weak. We will highlight the deconstructability of the current reasoning for and against the capital executions, in view of an absolute, categorical, unconditional condemnation of the death penalty.

Una prassi di senso. Su L'Adorazione di Jean-Luc Nancy

2014-01-10T16:41:40+00:00

L’adorazione è il titolo del volume che segue a La dischiusura. Decostruzione del Cristianesimo I e che rende compiuta la decostruzione del cristianesimo di Jean-Luc Nancy. Essa va dunque pensata in rapporto all’apertura della ragione e al cristianesimo dischiuso. L’autrice descrive l’adorazione come il fiore o il frutto della decostruzione, volendo rendere, con questa espressione, il fatto che in essa è in gioco il divenire, da parte del pensiero, “condotta”, prassi di senso, relazione con la totalità dell’ente.

ESSERE E RELAZIONE. NOTE AL BREVIARIO DI METAFISICA DI VIRGILIO MELCHIORRE

2014-01-10T16:41:40+00:00

In his Breviario di Metafisica (2011) Melchiorre inquires into the nexus between Metaphysics and Anthropology and the implied theme of relation, through which the entity defines itself and refers to the Being thought as principle of relation. The article aims at analysing in a critical way - particularly in the light of the Ontology of inexhaustible and of liberty - his speculative prospect, reflecting above all upon his conception of absolute (understood as incontrovertible and inexpressible), of the relation between absolute and reality (thought by means of the nexus of participation and of implied symbolic expression), of the problem of evil (meant in particular as error) present in reality and of the connection between Metaphysics and Hermeneutics (conceived according to that circle of a priori and a posteriori so important for Melchiorre in his configuration of the “immanent transcendence” and of the relation between identity and difference).

BIBLIOGRAFICA

2014-01-10T16:41:40+00:00

Con contributi di

Agnello
AA.VV., Democrazie e religioni. La sfida degli incompatibili, a cura di M. Ruggenini, R. Dreon, S. Galanti Grollo, Donzelli, Roma 2011, pp. 196.

Cecala
M. Bastit, La Substance. Essai métaphysique, Parole et Silence Eds, Paris 2012,
pp. 310.

Giuffrida
V. Sorge e L. Palumbo (a c. d.), Eros e pulchritudo. Tra antico e moderno, La
scuola di Pitagora, Napoli 2012, pp. 346.

Simonotti
R. Garaventa, Religiosità senza dogmi. Ambiguità e prospetticità delle religioni
storiche, Orthotes, Napoli 2012, pp. 302.

Treppiedi
T. Tuppini, Jean-Luc Nancy. Le forme della comunicazione, Carocci, Roma
2012, pp. 316.

Premessa

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

premessa agli articoli sulla Scienza della logica

LOGICA DELL’ESSENZA E TEORIA DELL’AZIONE IN HEGEL

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

In Hegel's philosophy, logic acts as a universal ontology, that constitutes the absolute foundation of reality, understood both as perceptible world and as concrete human world. Under this respect the regional ontologies of nature and of the objective spirit give shape to their configurations on the basis of the conceptual organization determined by the logical thinking.

Inasmuch as it contains the first deduction of the concept of freedom, the Logic of essence presents the originary and fundamental ontological structures of the practical sphere, thus highlighting the categories implied in the construction and in the explanation of the phenomenon of action.

IL MOVIMENTO DELLA VERITA’. Nota su quattro note della Scienza della logica

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

This essay deals with the semantization of Being, a question that you can find in the first pages of Hegel’s Science of Logic.

For the German philosopher this question is not abstract but includes the core of his thought. Being and Nothing are in fact not empty notions, but they embody the way in which the energy of the living and of the concept expresses itself in the human knowledge. One of the two terms, the Nothing itself, contrary to the ‘good sense’, leads the game as it is endowed with a force which is not only negative, but also plastic and modeling the world experience. It is in the Becoming that the Nothing can be thought and its outcome is the ‘determinate being’. For Hegel therefore the contest between Being and Nothing does not end in a draw, but it generates a different thought of the world, the speculative thinking, for which contradiction is not lethal but generates a transcendent meaning in which the human can be returned to itself.

HEGEL: LA LOGICA COME MANIFESTAZIONE DELLA LATENZA DELL'ASSOLUTO

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000228 EndHTML:0000004769 StartFragment:0000002823 EndFragment:0000004733 SourceURL:file://localhost/Users/leonardosamona/Desktop/giornale%20di%20metafisica/Logica.Samon%C3%A0.TRADUCCI%C3%93N.doc Il fallimento degli sforzi umani nel cogliere l’assoluto è il fallimento della teologia cosiddetta “razionale”, ovvero della considerazione di Dio como abbordabile dalla ragione umana. Vi sono due poli che si sono avvicinati pedem aliquantulum con un certo successo a questo mistero: l’estremo della semplicità (Aristotele) e quello della complessità (Hegel). In entrambi i casi ci si trova davanti ad una rassegnazione e ad una speranza: non è possibile dire ciò che l’Assoluto è, e seppure quello che non è, ma solo dire, pace Wittgenstein, l’impossibilità di dire per intero ciò che l’assoluto è/non è. La Logica hegeliana rende esplicita in maniera esaustiva questa impossibilità, che a partire dal suo occultamento consente di lasciar essere o non essere, lasciare che si manifesti in modo affermativo o negativo tutto ciò che sembrava limitarsi a voler essere, semplicemente. Solo che ogni manifestazione implica una riflessione: riflessione che, rinviando su di sé, riflette sull’altro. Considerata in maniera assoluta, questa relatio si dirige verso un mistero che origina al contempo la domanda, ciò che si domanda e colui che domanda, ma che in questa tripla origine resta sempre alle spalle.

Logica e tempo

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000222 EndHTML:0000003567 StartFragment:0000002516 EndFragment:0000003531 SourceURL:file://localhost/Users/leonardosamona/Desktop/giornale%20di%20metafisica/RUGGIULOGICATEMPOPALERMODEF2.doc The time is not part of the logic, but it is founded by logic. In the doctrine of being (quantity) and in the doctrine of the concept and mechanism both plays an essential role. In time logic it comes in its intemporality and therefore as everlasting, constituting the foundation and the essence of the time in its manifold occur both in reality of nature as in that of the spirit. There is not therefore a reduction of time in general while spatialized of nature, which presents itself as simply time intuition, as opposed to time as time or conceived time. The eternity of time expresses its need as an expression of the concept. The concept is the power of the time, and founds its negativity. Time is not given but set from social space structure of reason, which leads the meanings of unconscious or natural logic to clarification in the constitution of reality as equal to the I, to the concept.

LIBERTÀ E NECESSITÀ NELL'INIZIO DELLA SCIENZA DELLA LOGICA: UN CONFRONTO TRA LA PRIMA E LA SECONDA EDIZIONE

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

Version:1.0 StartHTML:0000000178 EndHTML:0000004125 StartFragment:0000002847 EndFragment:0000004089 SourceURL:file://localhost/Users/leonardosamona/Desktop/70-314-1-SM.doc The beginning of Logic has a close relationship with the outcome of the Phenomenology, wich Hegel summed up in a few lines in the chapter on the beginning of science: the ultimate foundation of phenomenological course is the free alienation of absolute knowledge, that makes itself other remaining in unity with itself. The paper shows the relation between the free self-alienation and the task of a "logical", "immanent" beginning of the philosophy, and the relation binding the logical necessity and the freedom. The differences between the first and the second edition of the Hegelian work are used to show how the growth of attentino paid to the free decision of the beginning, which is recorded in the transition from the first to the second edition, is not to be understood as intensification of subjective arbitrariness, but as freedom of the subject to "sacrifice" himself, i.e. to make oneself moment of the objective truth.

CONTRADDIZIONE – TOTALITÀ – ESPERIENZA. SUI PRESUPPOSTI, LA FORMA E I PROBLEMI DEL CONCETTO HEGELIANO DI CONTRADDIZIONE NELLA SCIENZA DELLA LOGICA

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

Usually Hegel’s speculative concept of contradiction is being analysed in the context of modern formal logic, as a commentary on problems arising from that discipline. But this leads to new problems concerning Hegel’s notion of contradictory things or concepts, because formal logic defines contradiction as a relation of propositions only. This paper, however, argues that Hegel did not connect his discussion of contradiction to modern formal logic but to the epistemological tradition of metaphysical logic which was founded in ancient Greek philosophy and renewed by Kant. Incorporated into this tradition, an analysis of Hegel’s concept of contradiction can show its strength as well as its limits.

Gegen den Nominalismus (Entwürfe zu einer Widerlegung Guastallas [sic])

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

Appunti, abbozzi e frammenti preparatori per la stesura di Vom Nominalismus gegen Guastella

SUL NOMINALISMO CONTRO GUASTELLA Nota introduttiva e traduzione italiana di N. De Domenico

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

Pubblichiamo a cura di N. De Domenico – cui si devono, oltre che l’edizione del testo, la traduzione italiana e le relative note di commento – un inedito di Franz Brentano, composto a Palermo nel 1900 in dialogo e in polemica con Cosmo Guastella. Alla traduzione italiana, che appare in questo fascicolo preceduta da una nota introduttiva del Curatore, seguirà, nel prossimo (3/2012), l’edizione del testo originale tedesco e degli appunti preparatori. Uno studio analitico del Curatore sull’incontro fra Brentano e Guastella verrà successivamente ospitato nelle pagine di questa Rivista.

/50189/ VOM NOMINALISMUS GEGEN GUASTELLA

2014-01-10T16:41:39+00:00

testo tedesco